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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
Advertising greatly facilitates the marketing strategies and promotion efforts of 
producers, firms, and commodity groups in the agricultural products and food industry. 
The essential purpose of advertising efforts for agricultural products is not only to 
enhance demand, but also to reduce decreasing consumption (e.g. red meats) for the 
commodity throughout the marketing channels (Ward, 2006). The function and task of 
the promotional programs would require different efforts among groups of products 
available. Promotional programs for differentiated products would focus on their 
characteristics of brands and individual firms. Other undifferentiated products would get 
more advantages with some sort of cooperative promotional efforts among producers and 
suppliers. Therefore, agricultural commodities have typically used cooperative generic 
advertising and promotional programs. Forker and Ward (1993) define generic 
advertising as follows: 
Generic advertising is the cooperative effort among producers of a 
nearly homogeneous product to disseminate information about the 
underlying attributes of the product to existing and potential consumers 
for the purpose of strengthening demand for the commodity. 
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Brand advertising induces consumers to purchase branded products by promoting some 
product attributes unique to the brand; therefore, it persuades consumers that the product 
is a differentiated good among the commodity categories (Chang 1988).  
The relative intensities between generic and brand advertising efforts depend on 
the brand identity and market structures of the commodity. Ward and Ferrara (2005) 
report that consumers purchase nearly 80% of chicken which is produced from highly 
vertically integrated markets with brand identity, while about 70% and 50% of beef and 
pork, respectively, are purchased without brand identity.  
Since the federal commodity promotion programs began in 1954 with the passage 
of the National Wool Act (Armbruster 2001), 18 commodities are currently under 
congressionally authorized programs. In addition, 35 or more are operating under a 
federal marketing order (Table. 1). U.S. farmers are assessed over $750 million annually 
through commodity checkoff to fund various generic commodity promotion programs 
such as generic advertising, consumer education, and product research. Historically, 
major commodity groups (e.g., dairy, beef, and pork) have invested majority shares of 
their checkoff budgets in generic advertising. Many studies in the agricultural economics 
literature indicate that generic advertising has successfully increased the industry demand 
for most commodity groups. One of the important assumptions about generic advertising 
is that each industry produces a homogeneous product. Therefore, the purpose of generic 
advertising is to increase industry demand while realizing equal benefits for each 
producer.  
In recent years, the circumstances around the agricultural industries have been 
changing. On the demand side, consumer preferences have been continuously changing 
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with rising concerns about food safety, nutrition, and health. On the supply side, as 
agricultural industries are more concentrated and vertically integrated, agribusiness firms 
tend to produce differentiated products with various product brands at the firm level in 
addition to the generic advertising programs at the industry level. Brand advertising 
intends to increase market share of the product by persuading consumers to choose its 
own brand over other brands. Through various brand advertising programs, producers try 
to differentiate their products by emphasizing their unique quality attributes. Obviously, 
this is not consistent with the objective of generic advertising. Opponents of generic 
advertising claim that since generic advertising sends a signal that all products are 
homogeneous, it weakens brand messages of differentiated products.  
Despite the potential conflicts between generic and brand advertising programs, 
the number of commodities participating in this program has been rising, and the funding 
levels also have been increasing (Beck 2008). An interesting research question might be, 
why do farmers and producers tend to participate in this collective promotion program?  
An answer to this question may be attributed to increasing free-rider and advertising cost 
problems. According to Ward (2006), U.S. commodity checkoff programs were designed 
to minimize the effect of free-riders and to create sufficient resources to pay for 
expensive media advertising. Traditionally, since agricultural products cannot easily be 
differentiated from competitors’ products and convincing consumers to purchase a 
particular farm product like an egg or a potato is difficult, generic advertising can help to 
expand total demand for the product. Many commodity programs are authorized with 
mandatory checkoff programs to minimize or remove free-ride problems and to create 
sufficient resources to pay for the promotion costs. To the participants in the programs, 
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the collective checkoffs may contribute to evenly shared benefits and the high cost of 
advertising, which is generally beyond the means of individual producers matching a 
perceptible effect on total demand.  While globalization and bilateral free trade 
agreements have producers and providers faced with more competitive environments 
domestically and globally, those factors encourage them to search for ways of increasing 
product demands (Ward 2006; Becker 2008).  
 
Problem Statement 
The success of generic advertising programs depends on product characteristics 
and market conditions. Forker and Ward (1993) suggest that successful generic 
advertising requires factors such as homogeneous product, no or little differentiation, 
well-defined marketing objectives, no monopoly, fair and equitable mechanisms for 
assessment, and distribution of benefits.  
As stated earlier, brand advertising has different objectives from generic 
advertising. Brand advertising is mainly funded by a single firm that has information 
about the brand. The primary purpose is to increase the brand’s sales quantities and 
market share of the products. In contrast, the purpose of generic advertising is to expand 
the aggregate market demand for a commodity. Therefore, generic advertising 
encompasses all products within the commodity category, including brands, without 
promoting specific brands (Forker and Ward, 1988). Another issue is that the suppliers of 
brand products have control over its quality (parts of brand attributes) and quantity, and 
thus they can change brand advertising programs accordingly. Generic advertising, 
however, is designed to promote overall product quality and industry demand.  
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With the changing market structure and environment, some differentiated goods 
producers claim that generic advertising gives an unintentional signal to consumers that 
all generically advertised commodities have the same quality, and therefore their brand 
advertising messages and efforts may get hurt by generic advertising (Crespi, 2002). 
Some producers have strongly challenged mandatory checkoff programs. Some producers 
have even asked USDA to change or abolish the checkoff programs, while some of them 
have petitioned the department to hold a producer referendum on whether a checkoff 
program should continue. Their deep dissatisfaction is that they consider the mandatory 
checkoff assessment “a double taxation.” Three court cases regarding the impact of 
generic advertising on brand advertising have reached the U.S. Supreme Court: Glickman 
v. Wileman Brothers and Elliot. Inc, 1997; United States v. United Foods, Inc., 2001; and 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 (see Crespi 2003 for more details 
about these and other related court cases).   
 A few questions related to this controversial issue include: What economic 
rationale are these court cases based on? What methodologies should economists use to 
analyze the issue?  Does generic advertising really hurt brand advertising or does it help 
all participants?  
 Several studies have tried to answer these questions in the literature. Lee and 
Brown (1992) and Ward (1992) find that both generic and brand advertising positively 
affect industry sales. Both studies also show that brand advertising significantly 
influences brands’ market share. Carey and Bolton (1996) find that as consumers become 
well educated about a firm’s product, spillovers from generic advertising become large, 
and with greater spillovers come greater incentives to collude on generic advertising by 
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firms. Crespi and Marette (2002) and Crespi (2007) find that generic advertising may 
help low-quality producers while hurting high-quality producers under a differentiated 
product environment. Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004) conduct experiments and find 
that generic advertising may decrease access to information about differentiating 
attributes. Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010) also find that benefits of generic advertising are 
not evenly distributed within firm size, and generic advertising leads to decreased firm 
profits.  
 Advertising affects market equilibrium and consequently firms’ and the industry’s 
profitability. Generic advertising especially is typically thought to expand total market 
demand. However, the nature of the changing demand shows varying aspects as the 
demand become more or less elastic while the curve itself shifts up. Several studies in the 
literature show that assumptions on demand changes have important implications for 
investigating advertising effectiveness. The present study assumes two types of demand 
changes:  parallel demand shift and demand rotation (Hamilton, 1999; Chung and Kaiser 
2000a; Chung and Kaiser 2000b; Jonson and Myatt 2006; Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser, 2010). 
The study develops an analytical advertising model that includes generic and brand 
advertising expenditure variables and attempts to examine the interrelationship between 
generic and brand advertising. The model is expected to show the impact of generic 
advertising on brand advertising when three types of demand changes caused by generic 
advertising are considered: shift up, rotating clockwise, and rotating counterclockwise.  
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Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of generic advertising 
on brand advertising. Specific objectives include:  
(1) Develop an analytical model of generic and brand advertising 
(2) Analyze the impact of generic advertising on brand advertising analytically 
based on three alternative demand shift scenarios: shift up, rotating clockwise, 
and rotating counterclockwise 
(3) Conduct a numeric simulation and graphically show the impact of generic 
advertising on brand advertising 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter includes three sections related to promotions: general classification 
of commodities and the role of advertising, advertising and demand theory, and generic 
versus brand advertising. The section on general classification of commodities reviews 
different product classifications by their natures and characteristics and the role of 
advertising theoretically. The next section on advertising and demand theory reviews the 
effects of advertising on demand, which covers the recent demand shifting framework 
within advertising. The last section of this chapter covers previous studies on the 
relationship between generic and brand advertising.  
 
General Classification of Commodities 
 Consumers demand varying and diverse information about commodities such as 
origin, nutrition facts, price, ingredients, product alternatives, quality differences, and 
product reliability. Advertising has been one of the most effective ways for advertisers to 
convey product information to large heterogeneous groups of consumers though mass 
communication. Even though uncertainties and asymmetric information exist, many 
consumers may find it easier to make adequate decisions on how, what, and where to buy 
something they need. One potential role of commodity advertising is to enhance the 
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understanding of broad general classifications of commodities: search and experience 
goods. Search goods are generally durable products that consumers can inspect prior to 
purchase. They usually have high market value and are bought infrequently (e.g., 
automobiles or food freezers). Experience goods are those that consumers actually have 
to consume in order to evaluate the positive attributes claimed in the advertisements, and 
they are relatively inexpensive. Agricultural and food products typically fall into the 
experience goods category (Forker and Ward, 1993, and Chang, 1988).  
Differences in advertising between search and experience goods can be found 
through direct versus indirect information. Advertising of experience goods is directed 
toward achieving repeated purchases through enhanced product awareness and perception 
(Ward, Chang, and Thompson, 1985). In the case of experience goods, advertising is 
subject to frequent change. Since the messages for the products are intended to encourage 
experiments, messages may be less factual and more suggestive.  
Another commodity classification is cooperative vs. predator goods. First, 
cooperative goods are classified as products that cannot be differentiated (Friedman, 
1983). While the total demand can be increased by advertising, the market share among 
product suppliers cannot be changed. Among this group, advertising which is either 
generic or brand advertising or both, identically affects consumer behavior. Brand 
advertising for cooperative goods would only occur if the benefits accruing to the brand 
exceeded the costs, even when others also benefited. Predatory goods can be identified as 
goods that can be differentiated but for which expansion in total consumption of the 
producer group is difficult to achieve. Advertising among such brands may cause changes 
in market shares but may not increase total consumption. Generic promotions may still be 
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effective, however, if there are specific product attributes common to the predatory goods 
(Forker and Ward, 1993).  
The characteristics of most agricultural commodities are located between purely 
cooperative or predatory goods. Such products can be differentiated within a range but 
still include many common characteristics. Therefore, generic and brand advertising 
programs tend to exist jointly for most agricultural commodities. 
 
Advertising and Demand Theory 
 The primary objective of advertising, as stated earlier, is obviously to enhance 
demand, particularly for generic advertising programs. Few studies that present the direct 
effectiveness of advertising on demand consider various variables that affect demand 
changes.  The variables include prices, incomes, policies, market conditions, and so on.    
 Nerlove and Waugh (1961) develop a theoretical model for cooperative 
advertising, and then apply the framework to discover the implications of the effects of 
advertising expenditures on the demand for Florida oranges. The study shows that in the 
constant supply (short run supply case), increasing one unit (an added dollar) of 
advertising expenditure would raise the gross returns to orange producers by over 20 
units ($20).  
 Thomson and Eiler (1975) estimate the short-run and long-run effects of generic 
advertising on New York City Milk sales. The results show that the additional 
expenditure of generic advertising directly increases milk consumption and producer 
benefits.  
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 Suzuki et al. (1994) study the effectiveness of the generic milk promotion in 
Japan using an imperfect competition model. The authors used the Japanese generic milk 
promotion data to measure the effectiveness of generic milk advertising while 
incorporating the degree of market competition. An imperfect competition model 
employing a type of conjectural variations was adopted to determine fluid premiums 
endogenously, and then compared with a conventional model assuming an exogenous 
fluid premium. The results show that the fluid milk premium was endogenously 
explained by the degree of market power, and the estimated marginal rates of return with 
the exogenous premium model were smaller than those with imperfect competition 
model. The result shows that analyses with an exogenous premium model likely 
underestimate the rate of return to milk promotion when imperfect competition is present.  
 Chung and Kaiser (2002) study the advertising effects on milk consumption in the 
United States with cross-sectional data. The authors point out the problem that aggregate 
time series data may provide misleading conclusions since the approach ignores the 
heterogeneity of individual behavior. They investigate whether the use of aggregate 
cross-sectional data significantly biases the estimated consumers’ response to advertising 
programs, and address the question of consistency between household versus macro-level 
advertising response models. The double-logarithm functional form is adopted using 
monthly household purchasing data from January 1996 through September 1999.  The 
results show that significant aggregation bias in all three variables estimated: price, 
income, and advertising. Particularly, the macro estimate of the advertising variable had a 
different sign from the mean of micro estimates. The results illustrate that the aggregation 
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bias could potentially mislead the advertising evaluation if one had access only to 
aggregate data.  
Johnson and Myatt (2006) develop a framework to analyze the transformations of 
demand. That idea is based on the notion that changes in demand are corresponding to 
changes in the dispersion of the willingness to pay of consumers. The theoretical model 
shows the results that dispersion leads to a rotation of the demand curve, and depending 
on the levels of dispersion, a firm should make decisions about a market posture alternate 
to the mass market or niche market.  A niche market position is complemented by high 
levels of dispersion, and a mass market position by low levels of dispersion. A new 
taxonomy of advertising is introduced distinguishing between hype, which shifts demand, 
and real information, which rotates demand. 
 Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010) develop a framework to examine effects of varying 
mandatory generic advertising assessment rates. A Cournot oligopoly model developed in 
this study shows that the distribution of benefits from generic advertising varies with firm 
size. The model also shows that the assessment rate may change the demand which is 
shifting and rotating but also increases firms’ costs. The results explain why small firms 
experience disadvantages from generic advertising.  
 
Generic and Brand Advertising 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between generic and brand 
advertising under product differentiation. The papers mostly focus on theoretical 
development of the effectiveness of advertising programs at firm and industry levels. 
Crespi and Marette (2002) investigate the effects of generic advertising on the product 
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differentiation among competing brands. Crespi and Marette’s framework follows Mussa 
and Rosen (1978) to develop an analytical model under the assumption of vertical 
product differentiation. The analytical derivation examines how the effectiveness and the 
optimal level of brand advertising are affected by generic advertising when market 
demands are derived from consumer utilities with differentiated product qualities. Results 
of the study show that generic advertising may benefit low quality producers more than 
high quality producers. The findings bring important implications to agricultural and food 
industries where products are becoming more differentiated. 
Hunnicutt and Israelsen (2003) examine brand vs. generic advertising effects in a 
differentiated product industry. Considering the monopolistically competitive industry, 
they develop a conceptual model for generic and brand advertising, which includes the 
market share and degree of product differentiation. Advertising benefits are clearly 
examined through the market expansion effects and branding effects through comparative 
statistic analyses. Chakravarti & Janiszewski (2004) examine the effects of generic 
advertising on brand preferences through experiments under various scenarios. Results of 
the experiments suggest that generic advertising may affect the consumers’ choice of 
brand by changing the consumers’ perceived brand differentiation. They also find that 
contrary to the objective of generic advertising, generic advertising may increase brand 
differentiation. Bass et al. (2005) analyze effects of generic and brand advertising in a 
duopoly market using an optimal control model. In this study, each firm can make 
decisions on its prices and levels of generic and brand advertising intensities. The study 
shows that a stronger firm with a higher effectiveness of advertising and gross margin is 
more likely to invest in generic advertising than a weaker firm, and the market share 
14 
 
mainly depends on the brand advertising. Crespi (2007) and Isariyawongse et al. (2007) 
extend the Crespi and Marette’s (2002) framework to vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation models, respectively.  
Although these previous studies provide a useful framework for understanding the 
relationship between generic and brand advertising programs, the relationship has not 
been clearly identified.  Most analytical results from these studies are not able to sign the 
marginal effects of optimal brand advertising and its effectiveness with respect to generic 
advertising. In addition, an empirical analysis has rarely been conducted.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
AN ANALYTICAL MODEL ON GENERIC AND BRAND 
ADVERTISING 
 
A Cournot Oligopoly Model on Generic and Brand Advertising 
We introduce a Cournot oligopoly competition model with generic advertising 
and brand advertising. Following Quirmbach (1988) and Hamilton (1999), the model 
considers generic advertising and brand advertising parameters as demand shifters. 
Unlike the previous models (e.g. Crespi and Marrett 2002; Crespi 2007; Isariyawongse, 
Kudo, and Tremblay 2007), the model developed in this study considers demand shift 
and rotations and elasticities of advertising and price. Applying elasticities and alternative 
patterns of demand shift to the model is expected to provide clearer results of generic 
advertising impact on brand advertising than previous studies.  
Consider a Cournot oligopoly market where exists a fixed number, n, of 
producing firms, and entry is not concerned. We assume some firms, k (k < n), in this 
market produce a branded and nonbranded product and may attempt to create subjective 
product differentiation through brand advertising. The products are substantially 
undifferentiated, but the brand products are advertised. Other firms, n-k, produce only 
nonbranded products (Tremblay and Polasky 2002: Zhang, Sexton, and Alston 2002). 
The firms producing nonbranded products face the same market demands, and compete 
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in quantity in the homogeneous market. The firms producing brand products that share 
the brand product’s market engage in competition to expand its market share. We assume 
the total brand advertising may increase market demand.  
The output of a representative firm i is denoted by qi and the market output, Q, is 
represented as: ∑= i iqQ . A marketing board of commodity controls the level of generic 
advertising expenditures funded by checkoff assessment. The mandatory checkoffs are 
levied to participants in the programs by a unit assessment rate, t. When the marketing 
board allocates the entire checkoff fee to the spending of generic advertising, the feasible 
generic advertising expenditures, G, is represented as: G=tQ. In the market exist brands, 
BN, less than or equal to the number of firms (products), i.e., BN≤n. Some producers 
invest their brand advertising for consumers to convince the qualities and attributes of the 
goods for subjective differentiation. The brand advertising expenditure for firm i may be 
denoted Bi , and it is a function of the expenditures of generic advertising, Bi (t). In 
previous studies, the effectiveness of generic advertising is only concerned expanding 
total market demand, and so the market demand curve would shift up rightward. In this 
study, we assume that the generic advertising affects in three ways: (1) shift the demand 
parallel, (2) rotate the demand clockwise, (3) rotate the demand counterclockwise.  This 
study focuses on the effect of generic advertising on brand advertising effectiveness.  
The market demand is given by the inverse demand function P=P(Q, t, B(t)). We 
assume that the inverse demand is twice continuously differentiable, and let the 
subscripts indicate partial differentiation, PQ<0 for all Q. That is, the slope of the market 
demand is downward regardless of the effects of demand shifters. The demand curve is 
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concave in generic advertising assessment rates and brand advertising expenditures, that 
is, Pt>0, PB>0, and Ptt<0, PBB<0.  
Based on these assumptions, we consider three scenarios. The scenarios start with 
advertising which leads parallel shifts demand, then considers elastic and inelastic 
rotation of the demand curve. The three scenarios related to shift and rotation of demand 
curves include:  
i) PQt  = 0 indicating parallel shift. 
ii) PQt< 0, PQB < 0 indicating inelastic rotation (clockwise rotation). 
iii) PQt>0, PQB >0 indicating elastic rotation (counterclockwise rotation). 
PQt ≡∂PQ/∂t denotes the change in the slope of demand curve (PQ ) with respect to the 
generic advertising assessment rate (t). The first scenario, therefore, Pt > 0 and PQt  = 0 is 
a parallel increase in demand, which is a demand shift typically applied in the advertising 
literatures. However, a case may occur when the brand advertising does not affect 
demand shift, but changes the slope of it. The second scenario, in addition to the concave 
conditions, PQt or PQB < 0, means that both generic and brand advertising decrease the 
variation of consumers’ valuation, and then make the demand curve steeper, consequently 
the more advertising, the less elastic the demand. The third scenario is the opposite case 
of the second one. The more advertising, the more elastic the demand. 
The firm i's cost function is given by ))(,( tBqCC iii = . We assume that while the 
marginal cost of production (
iq
c ) is constant for any output level qi, the marginal cost of 
brand advertising is increasing ( 0>
iB
c ) at a decreasing rate ( 0<
iiBB
c ). Each firm has an 
equivalent marginal cost of production and brand advertising expenditures.  
Then, the firm i's profit function may be written as:   
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[ ] ))(,())(,,( tBqCqttBtQP iiiiii −−=π . 
Differentiating iπ  with respect to qi yields the first-order condition as: 
(1)  0))(,,( =−+−=
ii qQiiq
cPqttBtQPπ
.
 
Then, the second order condition of firm i would be:  
(2)  0))(,,(2 <−+=
iiii qqQQiiQqq
cPqtBtQPπ . 
Rewriting equation (1) using firm i's market share leads to:  
(3)  0))(,,( =−+−=
ii qQiiq
cQPsttBtQPπ , 
where Qqs ii /= represents market share of firm i.  
Following Dixit (1986) , Seade (1980), and Vives (1999), conditions for existence 
and stability of oligopoly equilibrium are: 
(4)  01 >− Qqq Pc ii ,  
(5)  0<+ QQiQ PqP , and  
(6)  0)1( <−+=
−iiii qqiqq
s ππλ , 
where the second term of the right hand side of equation (6) is the summation of the 
output response of all other firms except firm i. Equation (6) is a necessary condition for 
a maximum, and requires (Hamilton 1999b; Seade 1980). 
To address the optimal brand advertising expenditure at the firm level, its 
expenditure Bi
* is treated as a continuous variable following Seade (1980), Besley(1989), 
and Hamilton (1999) . After the checkoff fee is set to maximize the industrial total profit 
by the marketing board, a representative firm’s optimal brand advertising, B*i(t), is 
derived from the following indirect profit function: 
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(7)  [ ] 0))(,())(,,( ******** ≥−−= tBqCqttBtQP iiiiiiπ , 
where the superscript,*, denotes optimal levels of checkoff assessment rates and output 
levels at firm and market. 
 
Impacts of Generic Advertising on Firm-level Output, Optimal Brand Advertising 
Expenditures, and Effectiveness of Brand Advertising 
To find the effects of generic advertising on firm-level output and the optimal 
brand advertising expenditure, total differentiation is imposed on FOC of equations (3) 
and (7). Combining equations, the result is  
(8)  ( ) dtcqP
QPsP
dB
dq
tBiT
QTiT
i
i
Bq
qB
iii
i






−−
+−
−=











−
1
1
** ππ
πλ
, 
where tBtT iPPP += and tQBQtQT iPPP += . Suppose the coefficient matrix in equation (8) 
is denoted as Φ. Then the determinant of the matrix Φ is:  
(9)  ( )( ) ( )( )
iii BQQiQiBBiQQiQ
cQPsPscPqQPsPDet +−−−+=Φ 12)( .  
Rewriting equation (9) with elasticity terms gives:  
(9)’  ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]BiiBBiiQ cEsscPqEsPDet −−−−−=Φ 112)( , 
where QQQ PPQE −≡  denotes the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand. A 
direction of E implies curvature of the demand curve: E>0, E<0, and E=0 implies convex, 
concave, and linear, respectively (Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser 2010). Implying the two 
stability conditions, two terms in the bracket, ( )Esi−2  and ( )Esi−1 , are positive. The 
first term, ( )Esi−2 , measures firm i's response to rival’s output (Hamilton 1999b; Zheng, 
Bar, and Kaiser 2010). Collecting terms and rewriting equation (9)’ yields:  
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( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }EssEscPqEsPDet iiiBBiiQ ii −−+−−−=Φ 1122)( . 
The first part of the brace in braces measures the slope of firm i’s marginal revenue 
changed by its own brand advertising (denoted by iQRBMR ), and the second part of the 
brace denotes the summation of the slope changes of the marginal revenue due to 
increasing marginal costs of brand advertising in the entire market (denoted by MQCBMR ). 
Then, the determinant can be rewritten as:  
( ) Ω=−=Φ QMQCiQRQ PMRMRPDet BB)( ,  
where Ω    . Three cases exist in determining the sign of the 
determinant, which shows the relative impacts of slope changes of marginal revenue to 
individual firm and entire market: 
 i) Ω  0,  ii) Ω  0, and iii) Ω  0 . 
We assume that iQRBMR < 
M
QCB
MR , therefore, Ω<0, and then Det(Φ) >0.  
 
 Impact of Generic Advertising on Individual Firm’s Output 
We consider first the effect of generic advertising on the individual firm’s output. 
Since the unit checkoff assessment rate has a similar nature to the production checkoff, 
the firm-level output is expected to decrease with the assessment rate. The impact of 
generic advertising on the individual firm’s output, therefore, is generally expected to be 
negative: 0<
dt
dqi
.  
 From equation (8), the impact of change of generic advertising (represented by 
the checkoff assessment rate) on the output of a representative firm is derived:  
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(10)  
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) BQQiQiBBiQQiQ
QBiiQtitBi
cQPsPscPqQPsP
QPsqQPsPc
dt
dq
+−−−+
−−+
=
12
1
,  
and is rewritten with elasticity terms as:  
(10)’  
( )
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]BiiBBiiQ
BiiBttiBti
cEsscPqEsP
ΨsqPPΨscP
dt
dq
−−−−−
−−+
=
−
112
1 1
,
 
where 
t
Qt
t
P
P
QΨ = ,
B
QB
B
P
P
QΨ =  , which represent the output elasticities of generic 
advertising assessment rates and brand advertising expenditures, respectively (Hamilton 
1999; Cowan 2004).  
 To determine sign of (10)’, we should consider the three cases of demand changes 
influenced by generic advertising, which are shift up, elastic, or inelastic rotation of the 
demand curve. Each of the cases is also dependent on the influences of brand advertising 
effects, which are no change slope, elastic, or inelastic rotation of the demand curve. 
Table 2 shows the results of signs of  ⁄  for each case of demand changes. Generally, 
when generic advertising attempts to expand total market demand (PQt = 0 shift up) and 
leads to elastic demand (PQt > 0 rotates counterclockwise), most of the signs denote 
positive except that the case of brand advertising leads to elastic demand. According to 
the results, when brand advertising makes the demand inelastic or does not change the 
slope of the demand curve, most of the cases are positive or conditionally positive except 
the case when generic advertising makes the demand inelastic, that is, rotates the demand 
curve clockwise.  
In the opposite case, when brand advertising leads elastic demand, most of the 
cases are negative or ambiguous. While generic advertising leads to increase market 
demand (PQt = 0) and rotate clockwise (PQt < 0, inelastic demand), if brand advertising 
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makes demand elastic, then the signs show negative or ambiguous. In the case of generic 
advertising generating the market demand curve to rotate clockwise (inelastic demand), 
most of the effectiveness show negative or ambiguous except when Pt>1 and brand 
advertising make elastic demand or do not change the slope of the demand curve, the 
impacts of generic advertising on firm-level output are conditionally positive.  
 
Impact of Generic Advertising on Firm’s Optimal Brand Advertising Expenditure 
Opponents of generic advertising argue that it may lessen consumers’ subjective 
perceptions about the brand’s differentiated attributes that have been increased by brand 
advertising (Glickman 1997).  If a firm spends more money for brand advertising to 
recover a brand’s reputation that was impacted by generic advertising, the sign of (11)’ 
would be positive, 0
*
>
dt
dBi
. 
The impact of generic advertising (represented by the checkoff assessment rate) 
on the optimal brand advertising expenditures of a representative firm is derived:  
(11)  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) BQQiQiBBiQQiQ
BtiTQQiQQQiQiBti
cQPsPscPqQPsP
cqPQPsPQPsPsc
dt
dB
+−−−+
−−+−+−
=
12
121*
, 
and rewriting with the elasticity terms yields: 
(11)’  
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) BiiBBii
iTiiiiBti
cEsscPqEs
qPEsEsEssc
dt
dB
−−−−−
−−−−+−−
=
112
12211*
.  
 The sign of equation (11)’ is determined by the direction of the numerator. At first, 
we determine directions of the second part of the numerator. Since the sign of the first 
term, (2-siE) is already known as positive, the unkown sign of the second part is the 
second term, (PT -1). Therefore, the sign depends on whether PT =1, PT >1, or PT <0. 
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Since PT is the summation of Pt and PBt, the results are dependent on the sign of PBt. We 
assume PT  and Pt ,which has scenarios with the values of it, are always positive , and 
then we can determine the sign of PBt with respect to the scenarios of Pt . Table 3.A 
shows the signs of all of the terms with respect to each scenario. Depending on the sign 
of cBt , the second differentiation of marginal cost of brand advertising with respect to the 
generic advertising, the sign of all the cases are represented in table 3.B.  
When the total effect of generic advertising on the inverse demand (market price) 
is greater than or equal to one, PT ≥1, and the effect of generic advertising on the 
marginal brand advertising cost is negative or equal to zero, cBt ≤0, the signs of these 
cases are positive except that there may be no impact when PT =1 and cBt =0. This result 
means that the firm would spend more brand advertising expenditures as generic 
advertising increases. Since the effect of generic advertising on the marginal brand 
advertising cost is less than zero in these cases, the marginal brand advertising 
expenditures increase with diminishing rate with respect to the checkoff fee. In other 
cases when the generic advertising assessment rate causes an increase, the marginal cost 
of brand advertising with increasing rate or at least no impact on it, cBt ≥0, and when the 
total effectiveness of generic advertising on market price is less than or equal to one (PT 
≤1), the signs of these cases are negative. In this case, generic advertising decreases the 
optimal brand advertising expenditures.  
 Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004) conducted two experiments. First, when 
generic advertising emphasizes a differentiated attribute, people prefer the premium 
brand and the premium brand share increases. In a second experiment, when generic 
advertising emphasizes a nondifferentiating attribute, while decreasing access to 
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information about the differentiating attribute,the generic advertising results in an 
increased price responsiveness.   
 
Impact of Generic Advertising on the Marginal Effectiveness of Brand Advertising 
In this section, we try to determine the sign of impact of generic advertising on 
the marginal effectiveness of brand advertising. Signing the impact is rarely found in the 
previous studies, since not only some scenarios and assumptions but also the model are 
not eligible to determine it.   
Totally differentiating firm i’s profit using equation (1), the total changes of profit 
can be expressed in terms of output and demand shifters as: 
(12)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) iBBiBtTiiQii dBcPqdtcPqdqdQPqd −+−−+−= 1π , 
and rearranging equation (12) for the marginal effectiveness of brand advertising on firm 
i's profit produces:  
(13)  
( )[ ] ( )
( )[ ] ( ),1
1
1
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iii
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i
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i
Qi
BBi
i
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i
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i
i
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dB
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dB
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dB
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dB
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−+
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
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

−−+=
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 −
=
−
−
π
 
where idq− denotes changes of all individual firms’ output except the firm i. In the right 
hand side of equation (13), since we know QP <0 and 
i
i
dB
dq−  should be non positive, i.e.,
0
)(
≤−
tdB
dq
i
i , The second term would be zero, because the generic advertising assessment 
rate is not dependent on brand advertising expenditures, that is, the sign of 
idB
dt
 is zero. 
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The signs of two terms, therefore, have the same direction, and then the sign of the 
second term is positive. For the last term, ( )
ii BBi
cPq − , we assume that the sign of the term 
is nonnegative, that is, the term, 
iBi
Pq , the marginal effect of brand advertising on the 
inverse demand times farm-level output should be greater than or equal to the marginal 
cost of brand advertising. According to these signs and assumptions, the marginal profit 
of brand advertising, 
i
i
dB
dπ
, 
 should be positive or at least nonnegative.  
 The impact of generic advertising on the marginal profit effectiveness of brand 
advertising can be obtained from the second total derivatives of equation (13), and the 
terms arranged as: 
(14) 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
( )[ ].2
1
2
1
21
2
tBBtBTBi
iBBBBiQBiiQBiB
i
ttBTTiQTiiQTiT
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iiiiiii
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dt
dBcPqdQPqdqPqP
dB
dtcPqdQPqdqPqP
dB
dqdQ
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Pq
dt
dq
P
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d
+−+
−++−+
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−

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



+=
π
 
We assume that the second differentiation of marginal cost of brand advertising,cBB, is 
constant, the third differentiation, BBtP , is constant, and QTTQ PP = .  After rewriting 
equation (14) with elasticity forms, we can now sign equation (14): 
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(14)’  
( )[ ]
( )[ ]
[ ]BtBti
iBBBiBiiBiB
i
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i
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Equation (14) has not been able to be singed previous studies. However, after 
rewriting equation (14) with elasticity forms, we can now sign equation (14). We 
previously assumed that PQ<0, PT and >0, PTT and  <0. The marginal effect of 
brand advertising on the competitors’ products is nonpositive as assumed in equation (13), 
  ! 0, and the marginal effect of generic advertising on the total market output is non 
negative, 
" # 0. The marginal effect of brand advertising on the total market demand 
assumes to be nonnegative, 
 # 0, and the marginal effect of brand advertising on its 
own products is assumed at least non negative, 
 # 0. We have a condition for the two 
output elasticities of generic advertising and brand advertising: those are less than one, ψT 
and ψB <1 based on the previous studies.  
With the assumptions and conditions, the sign of the equation (14)’ is dependent 
on the terms of  
"  and $ .  At first considering the first line of the equation, the sign of 
the term is dependent on the direction of the term, 
" . It is mostly positive when generic 
advertising generates market demand to shift up or elastic, " # 0, and brand 
advertising leads it to be inelastic or does not change the slope. " ! 0. In this case, 
applying the assumptions, PQ<0, % ⁄ # 0,  & ⁄ ! 0, the first part is positive or 
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at least nonnegative. For the second line, when ' ! 1, (" # 0, and generic advertising 
generate market demand shift up or inelastic, then    0⁄ , and    0⁄ . In this 
case, the second line is positive.  
With the first and second lines of equation (14)’, and PB>0 and ψB <1, the third 
part is positive. Considering the fourth line, when ' ! 1, " ! 0, and (" # 0, then 
the sign of the fourth line is negative. Combining the signs of all lines the sign of 
equation (14)’ is dependent on the relative size between the sum of the first to the third 
lines and the fourth line.  If the assumptions stated above are reversed, then signing this 
equation become more complex, and in some cases, indeterminant.  
 
Summary of Analytical Results 
  An analytical model is developed in this chapter to examine the impacts of 
generic advertising on brand advertising. To explain the relationship, we applied the 
theory of demand changes; shift-up, clockwise, and counterclockwise rotation. Through 
comparative statistics using elasticities of demand and advertising, we were able to sign 
three equations: the effect of generic advertising on an individual’s product 
dt
dqi , the 
impact of generic advertising on brand advertising expenditures 
dt
dBi , and the impact of 
generic advertising on the marginal profit of brand advertising effectiveness 
dtdB
d
i
iπ
2
.  
 When generic advertising expands the total market demand (shift-up) and makes 
demand inelastic (clockwise rotation) and brand advertising also induces inelastic 
demand, generic advertising positively affects an individual firm’s output and the 
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marginal profit effectiveness of brand advertising. When generic advertising influences 
brand advertising to make less elastic demand, the individual firm can reduce brand 
advertising expenditures. Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004) provide useful experiment 
results to support our findings. According to their experiment, generic advertising shows 
a differentiating (nondifferentiating) attribute decreases access to information about the 
nondifferentiating (differentiating) attribute, which results in an increase in the 
importance of the differentiating (nondifferentiating) attribute and decreased price 
response. In that case, generic advertising potentially redistributes market shares among 
brands. This implies that when generic advertising gives messages about subjective 
differentiating attributes such as taste, colors, figures, rather than objective information, 
generic advertising may help to change the consumer’s preferences to the brand product. 
Referring to the analytical results of this study, when generic advertising induces market 
demand inelastic (rotating clockwise), generic advertising helps brand advertising.  
 Zhang and Sexton (2002), however, suggest that inelastic demand of agricultural 
products would lead to a harmful effect for producers. The study shows that “in the 
processor/retailer oligopoly power, if advertising makes retail demand less elastic, it will 
exacerbate the oligopoly distortion in the market, an outcome harmful to producers that 
causes reduced farm sales.” 
 
  
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
SIMULATION 
 
Simulation Model 
A simulation model is developed in this chapter to further investigate how the 
impact of generic advertising on brand advertising changes while changing the degree of 
market competitiveness and demand elasticities. To conduct simulations, a parameterized 
model is developed. A linear model is widely used in applied studies for economic 
simulation because of its simplicity, and therefore a liner model is adopted for our 
simulation model in this study. For simulations, the marketing and individual firms are 
represented in two stage games. In the first stage, the marketing board determines the 
generic advertising assessment rate, t, to maximize the market profit. In the next stage, 
each firm simultaneously makes a decision on the size of brand advertising expenditures 
to maximize its own profit.  
 
Market equilibrium without advertising 
We start a competitive market without advertising. In this competitive market, we can 
find an equilibrium point, and normalize the point to one. In the competitive market, total 
demand ,Q, and inverse supply function, Z, are given as follows: 
(15)  %  )  *  
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(16)  +  , - .%  (. 
We solve the two equations for the competitive equilibrium quantity and price denoting 
P
c and Qc, and we assume the equilibrium point is normalized to one, that is, (Pc, Qc) = 
(1,1). Solving the two equations for the equilibrium, the optimal price and quantity are 
specified following equations;  
(17)  /  01232/4125  1 
(18)  %/  0&0632/74125  1. 
The relations among the parameters are )  1 - *, ,  1  (  .. In addition, the 
demand and supply slope parameters, α and β, can be expressed in terms of the demand 
elasticity and supply elasticity, both evaluated at the competitive equilibrium:  
(19)  P  99: :  * 
(20)  ;  99< <  51 61  (7 
 
The First Stage Solution 
The total market demand is represented as follows: 
(21)  %  ) - =>% - ?>@   *, 
where t is checkoff rate, tQ is the total expenditures for generic advertising, γ is the 
parameter of generic advertising expenditures and denotes the effectiveness of the 
generic advertising, Bi is the individual firm’s brand advertising expenditures, k is the 
number of firms, κ is parameter of brand advertising expenditures and denotes the 
effectiveness of it, and therefore @ is the total brand advertising expenditures in the 
market. This demand equation indicates that generic advertising shifts the market demand 
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curve parallel. Another assumption imposed to the model is that the agricultural supply 
chains and manufacturing have constant returns to scale technology with fixed 
proportions: Qr = Qf=Q, where total market demand at retail and farm levels, repectively. 
The market profit function of the commodity marketing board can be expressed as:  
(22)  Π  6  7%  C, 
where P represents the indirect demand, and C denotes the market cost function. The 
market cost function is defined as C  , - .%. The first order condition for maximizing 
the market profit with respect to output is follows:  
DED%     - %* F =√2>%  1I  .  0. 
Solving the equation for Q, we can obtain the optimal level of market output;  
(23)  %  5JK L166)  *  *.7 - 9=K - 3>=K6326)  *  *.7 - 9=K77O.    
To find the optimal checkoff rate, t, differentiating Q* with respect to t and setting it as 
zero, then we obtain: 
(24)    P60QR&41QR746JK4&PQR7 . 
 
The Second Stage Solution 
The individual firm’s demand function with brand advertising can be expressed as  
(25)    S) - =>% - ?>@   *TU67, 
where % represents the total generic advertising expenditures determined by the 
marketing board, n is number of firms investing brand advertising.  Therefore, n times Bi 
is to be the total market brand advertising expenditure, γ and κ  are the parameters and 
represent the effectiveness of advertising, respectively, and S(Bi) denotes brand 
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advertising share in this market, and in this case it is represented V>. The individual 
firms’ cost function can be denoted as follows: 
(26)  C  , -  . - W>. 
The profit function for this firm represents: 
(27)  X  6  7  C. 
Taking the first order condition for maximizing the profit with qi , and solving the 
equation for Bi, we can obtain the optimal level of brand advertising expenditures;  
(28)    Y6)-= >%**.72?√@ Z2. 
To find the effects of generic advertising on the brand advertising expenditures, 
differentiating the optimal level of brand advertising with respect to the checkoff rate, t.  
(29)  
99"  [\>]R√^&4_60-= √%&4"&417K`aR  . 
The next step is to find the impact of generic advertising on the brand advertising 
effectiveness of the firm’s profitability. Differentiating the profit function, equation (27), 
with respect to Bi, and then taking derivate, the result with respect to the checkoff 
assessment rate, t,gives:  
(30) 
 
9Rb99"  18>d*√√e fV6)√6%=  2*√e7 - 2*2.√√e - *√62*√e  3%=74*?√e - %=2√√e  %*.=√ - 2%=?7 h, 
where B denotes total brand advertising expenditures in the market, Bi is individual firm’s 
brand advertising expenditures, and G represents generic advertising expenditures.  
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 The simulation model formed with the linear function is characterized by five 
parameters: the price elasticities of demand (ηP) and supply (ε), generic advertising 
effectiveness (γ) and brand advertising effectiveness (κ), and market share parameter (δ).  
 The essential objective for the simulation is to show and examine the changes of 
optimal and marginal values in this industry when the generic advertising assessment rate 
is changed. To set up the starting values for the base simulation, the price elaticities of 
demand and supply are set to unitary at the competitive equilibrium: ηP = ε = 1.0. The 
generic advertising effectiveness parameter, γ, is fixed based upon its relation to the 
generic advertising elasticity of demand (ηG). From the given market demand function, 
equation (21), the formulation for the generic advertising elasticity can be expressed as 
follows:  
(31)     Q√K  Q>"K  Q√"K> .  
Equation (31) indicates that the parameter representing generic advertising effectiveness, 
γ, can be obtained from values of ηG, t
*, and Q*. Solving the entire expression in equation 
(31) for γ as a function of the other market parameters and ηG, it obtains γ=f(ηP, ηG, ε, f). 
We chose two levels of the generic advertising elasticities based on the values from 
previous studies. The lowest value is ηG = 0.03 (following Kinnucan. Hsia, and Jackson 
1997), and the highest value is ηG = 0.15 (following Carman and Green 1993). The brand 
advertising effectiveness parameter, κ, can be obtained through a similar procedure. From 
the given individual firm’s demand function, equation (25), the formulation for that can 
be expressed as: 
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(32)     ijS) - =√e - ?>@   * T kKlm- a k √nK o [_. 
Equation (32) represents that the parameter representing brand advertising effectiveness, 
κ, can be obtained from values of ηB, t
*, Q*, P*, , and Bi*. Solving the entire expression 
in equation (32) for κ as a function of the other market parameters and ηB, it obtains κ 
=f(ηP, ηB, ε, f, k, δ ). We chose the level of the brand advertising elasticities based on the 
values from previous studies and the value is ηB = 0.01. 
 The checkoff rate is imposed to the unit assessment rate, and its range is from 
$.01 to $1.50.  In the case of beef promotion, the Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and 
Research Board imposes a $1 per head checkoff on all sales or importation of cattle. And 
in the fluid milk case, producers and processors cooperate to increase fluid milk demand 
at the retail level, and the contribution is $0.15/cwt for producers and $0.20/cwt for 
processors.  
 We consider the market competition condition as duopoly (k=2), and oligopoly 
competition (k=3, 5, and 10). Therefore, the market shares are to be 50%, 33%, 20% and 
10%, respectively.  
 
Simulation Results 
 Figure 1.1-4 graphically show the impact of changing the generic checkoff rate on 
optimal brand advertising expenditures of the representative firm, Bi
*. Optimal brand 
advertising expenditures decline as the generic advertising assessment rate increases. The 
result is consistent throughout the scenarios. After the declining curvature passes a 
minimum point, it turns to be continuously increasing. The shape of these figures, 
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parabola, indicates quadratic functional form with respect to t, and it is a sort of typical 
cost function figure. The trends show little differences even if parameter values 
representing demand elasticities, advertising elasticities, and market competitive 
conditions change.    
 Figure 2.1-4 demonstrate the marginal effect of generic advertising on the optimal 
brand advertising expenditures, 
99" . The generic advertising elasticities vary shapes of 
the marginal changes of brand advertising expenditures with respect to changing checkoff 
rates. When ηG=0.03, that is, low responses to generic advertising relatively, the marginal 
effects are almost linearly increasing continuously through the varying demand elsticities 
and market competitiveness. When it ηG=0.15, which is a relatively high effectiveness of 
generic advertising, the figures depict parabola shapes except the inelastic demand case 
(ηP=0.5). The case shows exponential functional form through the t ranges, that is, at first 
the slope rapidly declines and then very slowly declines after passing a specific t level. 
This implies that when the market has inelastic demand or brand advertising generates it 
with relatively helpful generic advertising messages, then the individual firms may 
decline the cost of brand advertising expenditures. This result is consistent with the 
analytical results of this study and Chakravarti and Janiszewski’s study (2004).   
 The next simulation results illustrated in Figure 3.1-4,  and Figure 4.1-4 show the 
impacts of generic advertising on the marginal profits of brand advertising, 
9b9, and its 
marginal impacts, 
9Rb99". The third and fifth figures of the all figures give the results, and 
the trends are common in all scenarios. The marginal profits of brand advertising with 
respect to the increasing effects of the generic advertising assessment rate are linearly 
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decreasing, which is consistent with the arguments of opponents of generic advertising 
(United Foods legal case). When generic advertising emphasizes a nondifferentated 
attribute, the highly differentiated brands, or premium brands are perceived as more 
similar to the nonpremium brands and the choice share of a premium brand declines. This 
result is the case where generic advertising generates market demand more elastic or 
rotating counterclockwise. The analytical results of this paper also show that when 
generic advertising made the market demand more elastic, the impact of generic 
advertising on the individual firm’s output p99" q is negative, and occasionally the 
effectiveness of brand advertising on its own output p9rs9ts q is affected negatively.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Generic advertising programs managed by several agricultural commodity groups 
are a collective economic action to promote agricultural products. Several previous 
studies have shown the effectiveness of generic advertising in increasing producer 
benefits both empirically and analytically. While some producers favor generic 
advertising, others claim that generic advertising hinders effective brand advertising 
efforts.  
This study investigates the relationship between generic and brand advertising 
programs. A few previous studies indicate that generic advertising could harm highly 
differentiated brand producers (Crespi and Marette 2002; Crespi 2003; Insariyaongse et 
al.2007; Zhang et al.2002; etc). Although these studies provide a useful framework for 
understanding the relationship between generic and brand advertising programs, the 
relationship has not been clearly identified.  Most analytical results from these studies are 
not able to sign the marginal effects of optimal brand advertising and its effectiveness 
with respect to generic advertising, and the empirical analysis has been rarely conducted.  
 In this study, an analytical model is developed to examine the impact of generic 
advertising on brand advertising with alternative assumptions on demand changes (shift-
up and rotation) and elasticities of prices and advertising. The newly developed model 
allows us to determine the relationship between generic and brand advertising, which has 
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not been clearly shown in previous studies. Numeric simulations are also conducted to 
further examine the relationship empirically.  
 Analytical results show that the sign of impact of generic advertising on an 
individual firm’s output would be positive when the brand advertising leads to an 
inelastic demand while generic advertising with elastic demand increases market demand. 
Under the same environment, the study finds the impact of generic advertising on optimal 
brand advertising expenditures would be negative. The marginal effectiveness of generic 
advertising on the marginal profit of brand advertising also verifies the signs based on the 
assumptions and scenarios.  
 Simulation results show that when generic advertising leads to inelastic demand, 
generic advertising helps brand advertising and could decrease the optimal brand 
advertising expenditures. However, when generic advertising leads to elastic demand, it 
negatively affects the profitability of brand advertising and also the marginal 
effectiveness of brand advertising. These results are consistent with findings from 
Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004). Although the current study provides excellent 
insights on the relationship between generic and brand advertising, further studies are 
needed for more generalized results with more functional forms and more realistic 
empirical analysis with real data. First, the simulation model needs to build on more 
forms to accommodate to varying reality for the differentiated products. Second, the 
demand model can be updated to fit the combination effects of shift up and rotation. 
Third, with the real data, the more sophisticated empirical studies are needed. 
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Table 1. Checkoff Funds Available Under National Promotional Programs 
 
Start 
Year 
Fundsa 
($ million) 
Beef 
Blueberries 
Cotton 
Dairy Products 
Eggs 
Fluid Milk 
Hass Avocados 
Honey 
Lamb 
Mangos 
Mushrooms 
Peanuts 
Popcorn 
Pork 
Potatoes 
Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Watermelons 
1986 
2000 
1966 
1984 
1976 
1993 
2002 
1987 
2002 
2005 
1993 
1999 
1997 
1986 
1972 
2008 
1991 
1990 
$79.8 
$1.9 
$66.6 
$281.2 
$21 
$107.8 
$24.2 
$3.8 
$2.3 
$3.9 
$2.6 
$5.7 
$0.6 
$65.4 
$10.7 
$12-$16 
$89.5 
$1.6 
aThe most recent year reported.         
Source: Beck (2008).  
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Table 2. Impact of Generic Advertising on Firm-level Output, tddqi   
 0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
Case 1: Generic advertising does not change the slope of demand curve, PQt = 0 
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
- 
+ 
+ 
? 
Case 2: Generic advertising rotates counterclockwise the demand curve (elastic demands), PQt > 0 
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if tiΨs > 1−tP  
? 
? 
- if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
Case 3: Generic advertising rotates clockwise the demand curve (inelastic demands), PQt < 0 
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
- 
+ if tiΨs > 1−tP  
- 
- 
- if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
- 
? 
+ if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
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Table 3.1. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Optimal Brand Advertising Expenditures 
of Representative Firm; Scenarios 
 1=TP  1>TP  1<TP  
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
BtP =0 
BtP <0 
BtP >0 
BtP >0 
BtP ≥0 
BtP >0 
BtP <0 
BtP <0 
BtP ≤0 
 
Table 3. 2. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Optimal Brand Advertising 
Expenditures; tddBi  
 1=TP  1>TP  1<TP  
0=Btc  
0>Btc  
0<Btc  
0 
- 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
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Table 4. Impact of Own Brand Advertising on the Firm-level Output; ii Bddq  
Table 4. 1. No Effect of Generic Advertising on Marginal Cost of Brand Advertising; Btc =0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
Case 1: Generic advertising does not change the slope of demand curve; PQt = 0 
1>TP  
 
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
+  
-  
-  
? 
-  
+ 
+ 
? 
Case 2: Generic advertising rotates counterclockwise the demand curve (elastic demands); PQt > 0 
1>TP  
 
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+  
+  
+ if tiΨs > 1−tP  
? 
? 
+  if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
Case 3: Generic advertising rotates clockwise the demand curve (inelastic demands); PQt < 0 
1>TP  
 
1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
-  
+ if tiΨs < 1−tP  
-  
-  
- if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
- 
? 
+ if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
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Table 4. 2. Generic Advertising Increases Marginal Cost of Brand Advertising;  Btc > 0; 
Table 4. 2. 1. Generic Advertising Does Not Change the Slope of Demand Curve; PQt = 0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
TP =1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
- 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
TP >1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
+  
-  
-  
? 
-  
+  
+  
? 
TP <1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
- 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
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Table 4.2. 2. Case 2) Generic Advertising Rotates Counterclockwise the Demand Curve 
(Elastic Demands); PQt > 0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
TP =1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
- 
- 
+ if tiΨs < 1−tP  
? 
? 
+ if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
- 
- 
- if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
TP >1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+  
+  
+ if tiΨs > 1−tP  
? 
? 
-  if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+  if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
TP <1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
- 
- 
+ if tiΨs < 1−tP  
? 
? 
+ if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
- 
- 
- if tiΨs ≥ 1−tP  
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Table 4. 2. 3. Generic Advertising Rotates Clockwise the Demand Curve (Inelastic 
Demands); PQt < 0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
TP =1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+ 
+ if tiΨs < 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
+ 
? 
- if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
TP >1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
-  
+ if
 ti
Ψs < 1−tP  
-  
-  
- if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
-  
? 
+  if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
TP <1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs > 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
+ 
? 
- if tiΨs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
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Table 4. 3. Generic Advertising Decreases Marginal Cost of Brand Advertising; Btc < 0 
Table 4. 3. 1. Generic Advertising Does Not Change the Slope of Demand Curve; PQt = 0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
TP =1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
- 
+ 
+ 
? 
TP >1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
+ 
- 
- 
? 
- 
+ 
+ 
? 
TP <1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
0 
+  
-  
-  
? 
-  
+  
+  
? 
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Table 4. 3. 2. Generic Advertising Rotates Counterclockwise the Demand Curve (Elastic 
Demands); PQt > 0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
TP =1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs > 1−tP  
? 
? 
- if
 ti
Ψs ≤ 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
TP >1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs > 1−tP  
? 
? 
- if
 ti
Ψs ≤ 1−tP  
+ 
+ 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
TP <1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
+  
+  
+ if
 ti
Ψs > 1−tP  
? 
? 
- if
 ti
Ψs ≤ 1−tP  
+ 
+  
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
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Table 4. 3. 3. Generic Advertising Rotates Clockwise the Demand Curve (Inelastic 
Demands); PQt < 0 
  0=QBP  0>QBP  0<QBP  
TP =1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
- 
+ if
 ti
Ψs > 1−tP  
- 
- 
- if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
- 
? 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
TP >1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
- 
+ if
 ti
Ψs < 1−tP  
- 
- 
- if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
- 
? 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
TP <1 1=tP  
1>tP  
1<tP  
-  
+ if
 ti
Ψs < 1−tP  
-  
-  
- if
 ti
Ψs ≥ 1−tP  
-  
? 
+ if
 ti
Ψs ≤ 1−tP  
? 
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  Figure 1. 3. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Optimal Brand Advertising Expenditures (ts) k=2, uv . yz 
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Figure 3. 2.  Impact of Generic Advertising on the Brand Advertising Effectiveness k=10, uv . wwx 
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 Figure 4. 1. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Marginal Effectiveness of Brand Advertising on Profits k=2, uv . wwx 
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Figure 4. 2.  Impact of Generic Advertising on the Marginal Effectiveness of Brand Advertising on Profits k=10, {  .003 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 t
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
d2 pi
dt dBi
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 t
-0.18
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
d2 pi
dt dBi
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 t
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
d2 pi
dt dBi
 67 
 
6
7
 
                 
        i. Unit elasticity of Demand (  17                                                           ii. Inelastistic Demand 6  0.57 
 
  
         iii. Elastic Demand 6  1.57                                                                    
Figure 4. 3.  Impact of Generic Advertising on the Marginal Effectiveness of Brand Advertising on Profits k=2, {  .15 
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Figure 4. 4. Impact of Generic Advertising on the Marginal Effectiveness of Brand Advertising on the Profits, k=10, {  .15  
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Scope, Method of Study, and Findings: Generic advertising programs managed by several 
agricultural commodity groups are collective economic actions to promote 
agricultural products. Several previous studies have shown the effectiveness of 
generic advertising in increasing producer benefits both empirically and 
analytically. While some producers favor generic advertising, others claim that 
generic advertising hinders effective brand advertising efforts.  
This study investigates the relationship between generic and brand advertising 
programs. A few previous studies indicate that generic advertising could harm 
highly differentiated brand producers. Although these studies provide a useful 
framework for understanding the relationship between generic and brand 
advertising programs, the relationship has not been clearly identified.  Most 
analytical results from these studies are not able to sign the marginal effects of 
optimal brand advertising and its effectiveness with respect to generic advertising, 
and the empirical analysis has rarely been conducted.  
 In this study, an analytical model is developed to examine the impact of generic 
advertising on brand advertising with alternative assumptions on demand changes 
(shift-up and rotation) and elasticities of prices and advertising. The newly 
developed model allows us to determine the relationship between generic and 
brand advertising, which is not clearly shown in previous studies. Numeric 
simulations are also conducted to further examine the relationship empirically.  
 Analytical results show that the sign of impact of generic advertising on 
individual firm’s output is positive when the brand advertising leads to an 
inelastic demand, while generic advertising with elastic demand increases market 
demand. Under the same environment, this study finds the impact of generic 
advertising on optimal brand advertising expenditures to be negative. The 
marginal effectiveness of generic advertising on the marginal profit of brand 
advertising also verifies the signs based on the assumptions and scenarios.  
 Simulation results show that when generic advertising leads to inelastic demand, 
generic advertising helps brand advertising and could decrease the optimal brand 
advertising expenditures. However, when generic advertising leads to elastic 
demand, it negatively affects the profitability of brand advertising and also the 
marginal effectiveness of brand advertising. 
 
